Build security in. Don't bolt it on later.
Advanced reactors, SMRs, and microreactors get one chance to set their security posture before the first concrete is poured. NS-ISAC's Security-by-Design working group connects reactor vendors, EPC firms, operators, and labs around shared expectations.
SMRs and microreactors, secure from day one
The economics of advanced reactor deployment depend on standardized designs, factory fabrication, and smaller operating staffs. Security has to be designed for that operating reality, not retrofitted into it.
Standardized fleet, standardized defenses
When dozens of units share a reference design, a shared security architecture becomes a multiplier, but so does a shared weakness. The working group reviews design choices with that asymmetry in mind.
Smaller staffs, higher automation
Security controls have to be defensible with leaner on-site teams. That favors automated assurance, remote operations patterns with strong identity, and clear escalation to shared service organizations.
Novel siting, novel threats
Microreactors at industrial sites or remote installations face physical and cyber threat profiles unlike a traditional fleet plant. Security-by-design accounts for that up front.
Defense-in-depth, fail-secure by default
Architecture choices made on the design board echo through forty years of plant operation. The shared expectation: every layer fails into a safe, recoverable state.
Layered defenses
Independent layers (physical, network, host, application) sized so that no single failure or compromise puts safety functions at risk.
Fail-secure design
Loss of monitoring, loss of communication, or loss of credentials should reduce, not expand, the system's attack surface.
Diverse implementations
Where the safety case demands it, diversity in suppliers, firmware, and protocols limits the blast radius of any single-vendor vulnerability.
Security from concept through decommissioning
Concept
Threat modeling and security requirements established alongside the safety case.
Design
Security architecture reviews integrated into the design review milestones, not bolted on at the end.
Build
Supplier vetting, component verification, and secure factory practices documented and auditable.
Operate
Continuous assurance, change control, and program metrics that prove the design intent is being maintained.
Decommission
Data destruction, credential revocation, and secure disposition of digital assets through end-of-life.
Working with reactor vendors and EPC firms
Security-by-design only works if the people designing the reactor and the people building it share the same expectations. The working group keeps that conversation active.
Joint reference architectures
Shared digital control system reference architectures that vendors and operators can adopt as a baseline.
Security requirements traceability
Common templates for tracking security requirements from concept through commissioning evidence.
EPC security clauses
Model contract language for engineer-procure-construct firms that captures security expectations without slowing delivery.
Operator-vendor feedback loops
Structured channels for operators to feed operating experience back to reactor vendors before lessons get expensive.
Join the community.
Membership is open to commercial nuclear operators, reactor vendors, national laboratories, and critical suppliers.